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505 
Failing to Protect Public Employees’ First Amendment 
Rights: The Need for a Presumption of Public Concern for 
Truthful Testimony  
I. Introduction 
The law requires people to make difficult decisions from time to time, 
but public employees face a uniquely troubling choice regarding their First 
Amendment rights and their ability to testify truthfully in a court 
proceeding without fear of retaliation. Jerud Butler experienced this 
scenario firsthand when his sister-in-law called him to testify as a character 
witness in a child custody hearing.
1
 When confronted with the predicament, 
Butler chose what should be the correct option for the health of the justice 
system—he testified truthfully.
2
 Unfortunately, this choice resulted in 
Butler’s employer demoting him, highlighting the serious concerns with a 
system that creates an unwinnable scenario for many public employees who 
are subpoenaed to testify in a court proceeding.
3
 If called to testify, public 
employees like Butler have three options, none of which are void of serious 
problems.
4
 Public employees can testify truthfully and risk employer 
retaliation, refuse to testify by ignoring a subpoena and be in contempt of 




This Note examines the Tenth Circuit’s recent decision in Butler v. 
Board of County Commissioners and the implications of its rejection of a 
per se rule for truthful testimony, as well as its failure to adequately protect 
such speech. Part II explores important Court decisions on First 
Amendment rights for public employees, including Pickering v. Board of 
Education, Connick v. Myers, and Garcetti v. Ceballos. Specifically, this 
section analyzes how these opinions created the modern balancing test for 
public employee speech. Part III discusses the circuit split in how courts 
have applied the Garcetti/Pickering test regarding truthful testimony as a 
matter of public concern. Part IV provides an overview of Butler and 
explains the Tenth Circuit’s ruling in this case. Part V discusses the 
implications of the Butler decision and its impact on First Amendment 
                                                                                                             
 1. See Butler v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 920 F.3d 651, 653 (10th Cir. 2019). 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id.  
 4. See Adelaida Jasperse, Note, Constitutional Law—Damned If You Do, Damned If 
You Don’t: A Public Employee’s Trilemma Regarding Truthful Testimony, 33 W. NEW ENG. 
L. REV. 623, 623 (2011). 
 5. Id. 
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jurisprudence. This section also argues that due to the importance of 
truthful testimony for the justice system, circuit courts that reject a per se 
rule should recognize a rebuttable presumption that truthful testimony is a 
matter of public concern. Along with this presumption, courts should 
implement a broader interpretation of public concern to include topics such 
as testimony in child custody cases, in which child welfare is a public 
concern. 
II. Law Before Butler 
A. First Amendment Protection for Public Employees: Pickering/Connick 
Test 
The Supreme Court has “uniformly rejected” the notion that public 
employees relinquish all First Amendment rights and may be “subject to 
any conditions, regardless of how unreasonable” simply because public 
employment is a choice.
6
 However, before the 1960s, there existed a 
pervasive “unchallenged dogma” that public employees “had no right to 
object to conditions placed upon the terms of employment—including those 
which restricted the exercise of constitutional rights.”
7
 Justice Holmes 
exemplified this widespread belief in a Massachusetts Supreme Court case, 
commenting, “The petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics, 
but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman.”
8
 
In 1968 the Supreme Court shifted away from the notion that public 
employees had virtually no First Amendment protections against employer 
retaliation and restrictions on free speech.
9
 With this evolution of thought 
around First Amendment rights for public employees, the Court continued 
to recognize a state’s unique and important interest in regulating its 
employees’ speech as distinct from its interest in the speech of the general 
citizenry.
10
 However, the Court also acknowledged that public employees 
retain some First Amendment rights, notwithstanding their employment 
choices.
11
 Thus, the Court aimed to balance the citizen employee’s interests 
                                                                                                             
 6. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968) (quoting Keyishian v. Bd. of 
Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 605–06 (1967)). 
 7. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 143 (1983); see also Adler v. Bd. of Educ., 342 
U.S. 485, 492 (1952) (holding that public employees may have a right to free speech, but 
they have “no right to work for the State in the school system on their own terms”). 
 8. McAuliffe v. City of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 518 (Mass. 1892). 
 9. See Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568. 
 10. Connick, 461 U.S. at 140. 
 11. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568. 
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“in commenting upon matters of public concern” with the state employer’s 




The Supreme Court’s landmark opinion in Pickering significantly 
reshaped and expanded the historical understanding of public employees’ 
First Amendment rights to free speech.
13
 In that case, Marvin L. Pickering 
claimed his employer violated his First Amendment rights by firing him 
from his position as a high school teacher after he sent a letter to a local 
newspaper.
14
 In this letter, he criticized a “recently proposed tax increase” 
and how the Board of Education and district superintendent had “handled 
past proposals to raise new revenue for the schools.”
15
  
To afford public employees some First Amendment protection, the Court 
rejected the Board of Education’s position that truthful comments on 
matters of public concern “may furnish grounds for dismissal if they are 
sufficiently critical in tone.”
16
 According to the Court, Pickering’s letter 
was about a matter of public concern because it addressed the issue of 
“whether a school system require[d] additional funds.”
17
 Moreover, this 
type of question is such that “free and open debate is vital,” and teachers 
are “the members of a community most likely to have informed and definite 
opinions” about the allocation of school funds.
18
 In balancing the interests 
of both parties, the Court concluded that Pickering’s letter neither interfered 
with his daily job duties nor impeded the “operation of the schools 
generally.”
19
 The school board, therefore, did not have a greater interest in 
limiting its employee’s “opportunities to contribute to public debate” than it 
did regarding any member of the public.
20
 Thus, the Court held the First 
Amendment protected Pickering’s letter.
21
 
Years later, the Court in Connick v. Myers elaborated on how to apply 
the Pickering decision, adding another consideration in the balancing test 
for public employees’ First Amendment rights.
22
 Accordingly, the Court 
held that First Amendment protection for public employees only extends to 
                                                                                                             
 12. Id.  
 13. Jasperse, supra note 4, at 627. 
 14. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 564. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. at 570. 
 17. Id. at 571. 
 18. Id. at 571–72. 
 19. Id. at 572–73. 
 20. Id. at 573. 
 21. Id. at 574. 
 22. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983). 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2021
508 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73:505 
 
 
“speech on a matter of public concern.”
23
 In Connick, Sheila Myers, a New 
Orleans assistant district attorney, responded to an unwanted department 
transfer by distributing a questionnaire to her colleagues concerning office 
policies about transfers, employee morale, and the confidence levels that 
employees had in their supervisors.
24
 Myers’s supervisor, Connick, then 




The Court held that Myers’s questionnaire, with the exception of one 
question, was not on a matter of public concern, but rather about a “single 
employee . . . upset with the status quo.”
26
 In coming to this conclusion, the 
Court provided some guidance for analyzing what falls under the realm of 
public concern.
27
 When employee speech does not relate to a “matter of 
political, social, or other concern to the community,” public employers 
should have broad discretion in “managing their offices[] without intrusive 
oversight by the judiciary.”
28
 Specifically, courts must consider the 
“content, form, and context of a given statement” to determine whether 
speech is of public concern.
29
 In 2014, the Court once again mandated this 
case-by-case approach originally introduced in Connick.
30
  
B. Garcetti v. Ceballos and the Pursuant to Official Duties Standard 
The Supreme Court expanded the Pickering/Connick analysis when it 
revisited First Amendment protections for public employees in Garcetti v. 
Ceballos in 2006.
31
 In this case, Richard Ceballos, a Los Angeles County 
deputy district attorney, faced “a series of retaliatory employment actions”
32
 
after he wrote a memo and testified that an affidavit for a search warrant 
“contained serious misrepresentations.”
33
 Ceballos argued that the First 
Amendment protected his speech in the memo.
34
 The Ninth Circuit agreed, 
                                                                                                             
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. at 140–41. 
 25. Id. at 141. 
 26. Id. at 148. 
 27. See id. at 146. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. at 147–48. 
 30. See Lane v. Franks, 573 U.S. 228, 241 (2014) (holding that the public concern 
inquiry “turns on the ‘content, form, and context’ of the speech”). 
 31. Ashley M. Cross, Law Summary, The Right to Remain Silent? Garcetti v. Ceballos 
and a Public Employee’s Refusal to Speak Falsely, 77 MO. L. REV. 805, 808 (2012). 
 32. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 415 (2006). 
 33. Id. at 414. 
 34. Id. at 415. 
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holding that his memo about perceived “governmental misconduct” was a 
matter of public concern.
35
  
The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit’s ruling and created 
another step in the analysis. In addition to determining whether the speech 
at issue is of public concern, courts must also consider whether the 
employee’s speech “was uttered as an employee or as a citizen,” with the 
First Amendment protecting only citizen speech.
36
 The Court explained that 
“when public employees make statements pursuant to their official duties,” 
they are speaking as employees rather than citizens, so the “Constitution 
does not insulate their communications from employer discipline.”
37
 This 
distinction is important because restraining employee speech created in the 
context of one’s professional duties does not limit the employee’s First 
Amendment rights as a private citizen.
38
 Therefore, because Ceballos wrote 
the memo as a part of his employment responsibilities, the First 




C. The Garcetti/Pickering Test 
Following the Supreme Court’s opinions in Pickering, Connick, and 
Garcetti, courts now apply a five-part inquiry—often referred to as the 
Garcetti/Pickering balancing test—for First Amendment issues relating to 
public employee speech.
40
 When analyzing whether the First Amendment 
protects a public employee’s speech, courts consider: 
(1) whether the speech was made pursuant to an employee’s 
official duties; (2) whether the speech was on a matter of public 
concern; (3) whether the government’s interests, as employer, in 
promoting the efficiency of the public service are sufficient to 
outweigh the plaintiff’s free speech interests; (4) whether the 
protected speech was a motivating factor in the adverse 
employment action; and (5) whether the defendant would have 
                                                                                                             
 35. Id. at 416. 
 36. Erin Daly, Garcetti in Delaware: New Limits on Public Employees’ Speech, 11 DEL. 
L. REV. 23, 26 (2009). 
 37. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421. 
 38. Id. at 421–22. 
 39. Id. at 422. 
 40. See Butler v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 920 F.3d 651, 655 (10th Cir. 2019); Bailey v. 
Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 69, 896 F.3d 1176, 1179 (10th Cir. 2018). 
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Courts have taken different approaches in applying the 
Garcetti/Pickering balancing test, specifically regarding which speech rises 
to the level of public concern and whether courtroom testimony deserves a 
per se rule automatically designating it a matter of public concern.
42
 In 
circuits that have adopted such a rule, the second factor is always satisfied 




III. Circuit Split  
A. Circuits Adopting a Per Se Rule: Fifth and Third  
Two circuits have adopted a per se rule that public employees’ truthful 
testimony is a matter of public concern.
44
 The Fifth Circuit was the first to 
adopt such a rule in Johnston v. Harris County Flood Control District.
45
 In 
that case, Carl Johnston worked for the Harris County Flood Control 
District (“HCFD”) as a supervisor for many years before he testified at an 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission hearing on behalf of a fellow 
employee.
46
 Following his testimony, which was “not favorable to HCFD 
and its directors,” Johnston faced a “series of retaliatory employment 
actions.”
47
 His employer ultimately fired him for refusing to accept a 
demotion, prompting him to bring suit against HCFD.
48
  
In addressing whether Johnston’s testimony at the hearing was on a 
matter of public concern, the court held that “[w]hen an employee testifies 
before an official government adjudicatory or fact-finding body he speaks 
in a context that is inherently of public concern.”
49
 The court attributed its 
decision to adopt a per se rule for truthful testimony to the importance of 
                                                                                                             
 41. Butler, 920 F.3d at 655. 
 42. Compare Latessa v. N.J. Racing Comm’n, 113 F.3d 1313, 1319 (3d Cir. 1997) 
(holding that truthful testimony in a court proceeding is a matter of public concern deserving 
First Amendment protection); with Butler, 920 F.3d at 660 (declining to adopt a per se rule 
that sworn testimony is always a matter of public concern). 
 43. See Pro v. Donatucci, 81 F.3d 1283, 1288 (3d Cir. 1996). 
 44. See, e.g., Green v. Phila. Hous. Auth., 105 F.3d 882, 887 (3d Cir. 1997); Johnston v. 
Harris Cnty. Flood Control Dist., 869 F.2d 1565, 1578 (5th Cir. 1989). 
 45. See Johnston, 869 F.2d at 1578. 
 46. Id. at 1568.  
 47. Id. 
 48. Id.  
 49. Id. at 1578. 
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The Third Circuit joined the Fifth Circuit in adopting a per se rule for 
truthful testimony seven years later in Pro v. Donatucci.
51
 Pro, a public 
employee, filed suit against her supervisor, Donatucci, after he fired her for 
complying with a subpoena and appearing to testify on behalf of 
Donatucci’s wife in a divorce proceeding.
52
 Even though Pro was never 
actually called to testify as a witness, she alleged that Donatucci fired her 
for simply appearing in court as a potential witness.
53
 The court held that 
Pro’s speech (appearing in court to testify) was inherently a matter of public 
concern in its “form and context—that is, potential ‘sworn testimony before 
an adjudicatory body’” despite its content being about a private matter.
54
 
Furthermore, the Third Circuit held that the per se rule for subpoenaed 
testimony established in Pro also applies to voluntary courtroom testimony 
because the same policy rationale behind adopting a per se rule for 
compelled testimony is present in both circumstances.
55
  
B. Circuits Rejecting a Per Se Rule: Fourth, Seventh, Eighth, and Eleventh  
Four circuits have rejected a per se rule that truthful testimony 
automatically qualifies as a matter of public concern.
56
 The Fourth Circuit 
was the first to reject such a rule in Arvinger v. Mayor & City Council of 
Baltimore.
57
 In that case, Stephen Arvinger, a school police officer, sued the 
Department of Education after his employer fired him for speaking to 
investigators about a sex-discrimination suit filed by a female co-worker 
(Diane Diggs).
58
 When analyzing whether the First Amendment protected 
Avinger’s statements to investigators, the court clarified that a statement 
                                                                                                             
 50. Id. 
 51. See 81 F.3d 1283, 1290–91 (3d Cir. 1996); see also Green v. Phila. Hous. Auth., 
105 F.3d 882, 887 (3d Cir. 1997) (“In Pro, we held the context of a courtroom appearance 
raises speech to a level of public concern, regardless of its content.”). 
 52. Pro, 81 F.3d at 1285. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at 1288 (quoting Freeman v. McKellar, 795 F. Supp. 733, 739 (E.D. Pa. 1992)). 
 55. Green, 105 F.3d at 886 (holding that both compelled and voluntary testimony 
deserve First Amendment protection to promote the “integrity of the truth-seeking process”).  
 56. See Arvinger v. Mayor & City Council of Balt., 862 F.2d 75, 79 (4th Cir. 1988); 
Wright v. Ill. Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 40 F.3d 1492, 1505 (7th Cir. 1994); Padilla 
v. S. Harrison R-II Sch. Dist., 181 F.3d 992, 996–97 (8th Cir. 1999); Maggio v. Sipple, 211 
F.3d 1346, 1352–54 (11th Cir. 2000). 
 57. 862 F.2d at 79. 
 58. Id. at 76–77. 
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about private interests which is “otherwise devoid of public concern,” does 
not satisfy the Pickering test.
59
 The court vehemently rejected a per se rule 
by holding that it is “irrelevant for [F]irst [A]mendment purposes that the 
statement was made in the course of an official hearing.”
60
 Because 
Arvinger’s statement “was made solely to further the interests of Mr. 
Arvinger and Ms. Diggs” and not to “further the public debate on 
employment discrimination” or another topic of public concern, the 
statement was not protected despite being part of an official hearing.
61
 The 
Eighth and Eleventh Circuits similarly rejected a blanket rule that truthful 
testimony is always a matter of public concern.
62
 
The Seventh Circuit similarly rejected a per se rule “according absolute 
First Amendment protection” to sworn testimony in Wright v. Illinois 
Department of Children & Family Services.
63
 But unlike the Fourth Circuit, 
the Seventh Circuit did acknowledge the unique importance of protecting 
such testimony.
64
 Thus, the court sought to safeguard this type of employee 
speech using the third prong of the Garcetti/Pickering test,
65
 which 
considers “whether the government’s interests, as employer, in promoting 
the efficiency of the public service are sufficient to outweigh the plaintiff’s 
free speech interests.”
66
 Despite not adopting a per se rule for courtroom 
testimony, the Wright court explained that an employee called to testify in a 
court proceeding has a “compelling interest in testifying truthfully,” such 
that an “employer can have an offsetting interest in preventing her from 
doing so only in the rarest of cases.”
67
 
                                                                                                             
 59. Id. at 79. 
 60. Id.  
 61. Id. 
 62. See Padilla v. S. Harrison R-II Sch. Dist., 181 F.3d 992, 997 (8th Cir. 1999) 
(holding that a teacher’s testimony about the propriety of a hypothetical sexual relationship 
between a student and a teacher was not on a matter of public concern); Maggio v. Sipple, 
211 F.3d 1346, 1353 (11th Cir. 2000) (holding that an employee’s testimony in an 
administrative grievance hearing for a fellow employee was not of public concern because 
the purpose of her testimony was not to “raise issues of public concern,” but rather “to 
support the grievance of her supervisor” and “curry the favor” of her supervisor for her own 
benefit). 
 63. 40 F.3d 1492, 1505 (7th Cir. 1994). 
 64. See id. (explaining that the Court “share[s] [its] colleagues’ concern for the integrity 
of the judicial process”). But see Arvinger v. Mayor & City Council of Balt., 862 F.2d 75, 79 
(4th Cir. 1988) (holding that the fact that a statement was made during an official hearing is 
“irrelevant for [F]irst [A]mendment purposes”). 
 65. See Wright, 40 F.3d at 1505. 
 66. Butler v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 920 F.3d 651, 655 (10th Cir. 2019). 
 67. Wright, 40 F.3d at 1505. 
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IV. Statement of the Case 
A. The Tenth Circuit Joins the Circuit Split in Butler 
In Butler, the Tenth Circuit weighed in on the debate surrounding First 
Amendment rights for public employees and whether truthful testimony is 
per se a matter of public concern.
68
 The court considered how other circuits 
have ruled on this issue and the various arguments that led to the current 
circuit split.
69
 In deciding the Butler case, the Tenth Circuit declined to 
adopt a per se rule designating truthful testimony as a matter of public 





Butler arose after Jerud Butler’s employer disciplined him for testifying 
in court.
71
 Butler worked for the San Miguel County Road and Bridge 
Department.
72
 His employer offered to promote him to a district supervisor 
position on September 1, 2016.
73
 Six days after he accepted the promotion, 
however, “Butler testified in a child custody hearing in Montrose 
County . . . involving his sister-in-law and her ex-husband, who [was] also 
an employee of the San Miguel County, Road and Bridge Department.”
74
 
Though Butler voluntarily testified as a character witness at his sister-in-




During his testimony, Butler truthfully answered questions about “the 
hours of operation for the San Miguel County Road and Bridge 
Department . . . based upon his own personal knowledge.”
76
 Following this 
testimony, two County Directors “conducted an investigation into Butler’s 
testimony” at the custody hearing and subsequently issued Butler a 




                                                                                                             
 68. See Butler, 920 F.3d at 657 
 69. Id. at 658–61. 
 70. Id. at 663. 
 71. Id. at 653. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at 654. 
 74. Id. (quoting Complaint ¶ 15, Butler, 920 F.3d 651 (No. 17-cv-00577)). 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. (quoting Complaint, supra note 74, ¶¶ 18–19). 
 77. Id. (quoting Complaint, supra note 74, ¶ 23). 
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C. Procedural History and Issue  
After his employers retaliated against him because of his testimony at the 
custody hearing, Butler filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the 
County Directors who conducted the investigation and demoted him.
78
 In 
his lawsuit, Butler alleged the County Directors violated his “right to free 
speech under the First and Fourteenth Amendments by demoting him for 
testifying truthfully at the custody hearing.”
79
 The district court granted the 
County Directors’ 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, reasoning that “Butler had 
failed to allege a First Amendment violation because his triggering speech 
was not on a matter of public concern.”
80
  
Butler challenged that decision by filing an appeal to the Tenth Circuit.
81
 
On appeal, the court reviewed the issue of whether truthful testimony is per 
se a matter of public concern, and if not, whether Butler’s testimony was on 




In Butler, the Tenth Circuit joined the circuits that have rejected a per se 
rule for truthful testimony as a matter of public concern.
83
 In doing so, the 
court applied the Garcetti/Pickering balancing test to determine whether 
Butler’s testimony in the custody hearing was protected First Amendment 
speech.
84
 Because the County Directors conceded Butler testified as a 
private citizen, not pursuant to his official employment duties, Butler’s 
testimony satisfied the first prong of the balancing test.
85
 As a result, the 
court primarily focused on the second inquiry—“whether the speech was on 
a matter of public concern.”
86
 After concluding that Butler’s testimony was 
not of public concern, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s 





                                                                                                             
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. at 655. 
 82. Id. at 656–57. 
 83. Id. at 657. 
 84. Id. at 655. 
 85. Id. 
 86. See id. (quoting Bailey v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 69, 896 F.3d 1176, 1181 (10th Cir. 
2018)). 
 87. See id. at 664–65. 
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1. Rejecting a Per Se Rule of Public Concern for Sworn Testimony 
The court rejected Butler’s argument that courts should always designate 
sworn testimony as a matter of public concern, stating that the Supreme 
Court has “mandated a case-by-case approach.”
88
 Thus, the court opted to 
follow the Supreme Court’s analysis in Connick and Lane v. Franks, 
considering the “content, form and context” of public employee speech or 
testimony to determine if it is of public concern.
89
  
The court supported its decision to follow a case-by-case approach in 
lieu of a per se rule for truthful testimony by relying on the Supreme 
Court’s discussion of public employee speech in the form of sworn 
testimony in Lane.
90
 Following a circuit split in how courts determine 
whether testimonial speech is of public concern, the Lane Court provided 
guidance. Specifically, it acknowledged that when considering the form and 
context of a public employee’s speech, whether the speech is sworn 
testimony is “a factor to consider” that often fortifies a finding that the 
speech is of public concern, but is not dispositive, rendering a per se rule 
“inappropriate.”
91
 According to Tenth Circuit, Lane indicates that content 
remains a relevant inquiry for determining whether public employee speech 
is of public concern, even when the form of the speech is sworn testimony 
in a judicial proceeding.
92
  
The court cited previous Tenth Circuit cases which used a case-by-case 
approach for analyzing courtroom testimony.
93
 In Bailey v. Independent 
School District Number 69, the court performed a content, form, and 
context analysis to determine whether a public employee’s letter “seeking a 
reduced sentence for his relative” was of public concern.
94
 Though the 
Tenth Circuit had never “expressly considered” adopting a per se rule 
rendering all sworn testimony by public employees a matter of public 
concern, its application of a case-by-case approach in past cases provided 
yet another basis for the official rejection of a per se rule in Butler.
95
  
                                                                                                             
 88. Id. at 657. 
 89. Id. at 658 (first citing Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983); and then citing Lane 
v. Franks, 573 U.S. 228 (2014)). 
 90. See id. at 657–58. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. at 658. 
 93. See, e.g., id. (discussing Bailey v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 69, 896 F.3d 1176, 1179 
(10th Cir. 2018)); see also id. at 662 (citing Melton v. City of Okla. City, 879 F.2d 706, 
713–14 (10th Cir. 1989)). 
 94. Bailey, 896 F.3d at 1179. 
 95. See Butler, 920 F.3d at 662–63. 
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The Butler court acknowledged the circuit split about sworn testimony 
before the Supreme Court issued the Lane opinion and maintained that the 
conflicting circuit opinions strengthened its decision to reject a per se rule 
for courtroom testimony.
96
 In doing so, the court appreciated the Fifth and 
Third Circuit’s reasoning in adopting a per se rule for truthful testimony 
and the desire to protect the “integrity of the truth-seeking functions of 
courts.”
97
 However, it maintained that the purpose of the Garcetti/Pickering 
test is not to “protect[] the integrity” of the justice system, but rather to 
determine if “the First Amendment protects a public employee’s speech.”
98
 
The court insisted that there are other sufficient processes in place designed 
to uphold the “truth-seeking function” of the court system, such as 




2. Holding That Butler’s Testimony Was Not of Public Concern  
After rejecting a per se rule for sworn testimony, the Tenth Circuit also 
held that Butler’s testimony in the custody hearing was not on a matter of 
public concern.
100
 In reaching this conclusion, the court considered the 
purpose of the speech and whether it simply dealt with “personal disputes 
and grievances unrelated to the public’s interest.”
101
 The court determined 
that Butler’s motive for testifying was for personal reasons rather than for 
reasons “involving impropriety or malfeasance of government officials” or 
any other reason that would bring the testimony into the “realm of public 
concern.”
102
 Because Butler’s testimony centered on a personal matter, 
which is typically not of interest to the community at large, the court did 
not view his speech as a matter of public concern.
103
  
By determining Butler’s testimony was not of public concern, the Tenth 
Circuit rejected Butler’s argument that the state’s interest in child welfare 
and the fair adjudication of child custody disputes rendered his speech of 
public interest.
104
 Accordingly, the court stated that Colorado’s general 
interest in child welfare and custody matters did not automatically make 
                                                                                                             
 96. Id. at 660. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id.  
 99. Id.  
 100. Id. at 663. 
 101. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Bailey v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 69, 
896 F.3d 1176, 1181 (10th Cir. 2018)). 
 102. Id. at 664. 
 103. Id. at 663–64. 
 104. Id. at 664. 
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speech on such topics matters of public concern worthy of First 
Amendment protections.
105
 Even if the topic of the speech is of interest to 
the general public, “what is actually said must meet the public concern 
threshold” as well.
106
 The specific content of Butler’s testimony largely 
pertained to his sister-in-law’s character and the County Road and Bridge 
Department’s operating hours, which the court said failed to meet the public 
concern threshold for protected First Amendment speech.
107
 
The court distinguished Butler’s testimony from the speech at issue in 
Wright, a case in which the Seventh Circuit determined that a social 
worker’s testimony about the state’s “methods of investigating an allegation 
of child abuse” was of public concern because it “address[ed] serious 
systematic deficiencies in the operation of a public department” and was 
therefore of great interest to the community at large.
108
 Thus, the speech in 
Wright did not reach the level of public concern simply because it was 
testimony in a child custody proceeding.
109
 Rather, its content about the 
“procedural and substantive shortcomings” in the public department’s 
operation rendered the speech of public interest, unlike Butler’s testimony, 
which the court considered largely personal in nature.
110
 
V. Implications and Shortcomings of Butler  
While the Butler court correctly rejected a per se rule for sworn 
testimony in light of Supreme Court precedent,
111
 the Tenth Circuit’s 
analysis of the content, form, and context of Butler’s speech at the custody 
hearing negatively impacts the health of the justice system and places 
public employees in an unfair position.
112
 Although it acknowledged that 
the form and context of public employee speech in courtroom testimony 
                                                                                                             
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. (quoting Nixon v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 784 F.3d 1364, 1368 (10th Cir. 
2015)). 
 107. Id.  
 108. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Wright v. Ill. Dep’t of Children & 
Family Servs., 40 F.3d 1492, 1505–06 (7th Cir. 1994)).  
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. (quoting Wright, 40 F.3d at 1502). 
 111. See Lane v. Franks, 573 U.S. 228, 241 (2014) (“The inquiry turns on the ‘content, 
form, and context’ of the speech.” (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147–48) 
(1983))); Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 454 (2011) (“[N]o factor is dispositive, and it is 
necessary to evaluate all the circumstances of the speech.”). 
 112. See Green v. Phila. Hous. Auth., 105 F.3d 882, 887 (3d Cir. 1997) (“[T]he integrity 
of the judicial process would be damaged if we were to permit unchecked retaliation for . . . 
truthful testimony.”). 
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“weigh in favor of treating it as a matter of public concern,”
113
 the court 
largely considered content alone in deciding Butler’s testimony was not of 
public concern.
114
 By not properly weighing the importance of form and 
context, but primarily—if not solely—considering the content of Butler’s 
speech, the court “violate[d] the very Supreme Court mandate [it] claim[ed] 
to honor in rejecting a per se rule.”
115
 Courts can and should place a high 
value on truthful testimony and seek to protect this speech in ways that are 
consistent with First Amendment precedent. Accordingly, courts should 
adopt a rebuttable presumption that sworn testimony in a judicial 
proceeding is of public concern. 
A. A Rebuttable Presumption of Public Concern for Sworn Testimony  
A presumption of public concern for sworn testimony is consistent with 
the Supreme Court’s assertion that the context and form of in-court 
testimony “fortif[ies]” the conclusion that such speech is a matter of public 
concern.
116
 Courtroom testimony is unique in its formality, gravity, and 
ability to impress upon a witness that “his or her statements will be the 
basis for official governmental action, action that often affects the rights 
and liberties of others.”
117
 These Supreme Court statements clearly support 
a significant presumption that testimony under oath is not solely a private 
matter.
118
 A public concern presumption for sworn testimony encapsulates 
the value of witness testimony in the judicial process and the public’s 
inherent interest in such testimony.
119
  
Because the fear of employer discipline or retaliation “undermines a 
witness’ willingness to testify,” it is vital to analyze truthful testimony 
under the rebuttable presumption that it is of public concern.
120
 Insufficient 
protection of public employee testimony hinders the accuracy and 
effectiveness of the judicial system by fostering an environment in which 
witnesses may not feel safe to testify wholly and truthfully.
121
 Moreover, 
                                                                                                             
 113. Butler, 920 F.3d at 663.  
 114. See id. at 665 (Lucero, J., dissenting). 
 115. Id.  
 116. See Lane, 573 U.S. at 241. 
 117. United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 721 (2012). 
 118. See Butler, 920 F.3d at 669 (Lucero, J., dissenting). 
 119. See Johnston v. Harris Cnty. Flood Control Dist., 869 F.2d 1565, 1578 (5th Cir. 
1989) (concluding that the importance of testimony for the judicial system is sufficient to 
render speech in that context of public concern). 
 120. Butler, 920 F.3d at 666 (Lucero, J., dissenting). 
 121. Joseph Deloney, Note, Protecting Public Employee Trial Testimony, 91 CHI.-KENT 
L. REV. 709, 711 (2016). 
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the consequences for refusing to testify or testifying untruthfully to avoid 
employer retaliation are far too grave to unnecessarily impose upon 
employees.
122
 It is unfair for courts to put public employees in the 
“impossible position” of either risking “substantial penalties, including 
incarceration” if they neglect the duty to testify truthfully, or risking 
significant adverse employment consequences if they comply with the 
duty.
123
 Therefore, courts should make a serious effort to afford First 
Amendment protection to sworn testimony for public employees to the 
extent that Supreme Court precedent allows. Implementing a rebuttable 
presumption of public concern for truthful testimony is the best way to 
adequately protect public employees’ First Amendment rights without 
ignoring the Court’s mandate for a case-by-case approach.
124
 
A rebuttable presumption that sworn testimony is of public concern 
would not preclude public employers from successfully arguing that 
employee testimony is wholly on a private matter if it is one of the few 
situations in which that may be the case. Furthermore, even with a 
presumption that would treat most truthful testimony as a matter of public 
concern, the government could still prevail on the third prong of the 
Garcetti/Pickering balancing test by showing that its interests “in 
promoting the efficiency of the public service are sufficient to outweigh the 
plaintiff’s free speech interests.”
125
 In balancing these interests, employers 
must show a more substantial governmental interest for regulating 
employee speech with a high degree of public concern.
126
 Thus, even if an 
employee’s speech satisfies the public concern requirement under the 
presumption for truthful testimony, employers will have to meet a lower 
                                                                                                             
 122. See Lemay Diaz, Comment, Truthful Testimony as the “Quintessential Example of 
Speech as a Citizen”: Why Lane v. Franks Lays the Groundwork for Protecting Public 
Employee Truthful Testimony, 46 SETON HALL L. REV. 565, 591 (2016) (explaining that an 
employee called to testify is in an “impossible position, torn between” retaliation from his 
employer and legal consequences for failing to testify truthfully). 
 123. Id. 
 124. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147–48 (1983) (concluding that courts must 
look at the “content, form, and context” of public employee speech). 
 125. Butler, 920 F.3d at 655 (quoting Bailey v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 69, 896 F.3d 1176, 
1181 (10th Cir. 2018)). 
 126. See Lane v. Franks, 573 U.S. 228, 242 (2014) (“We have also cautioned, however, 
that ‘a stronger showing [of government interests] may be necessary if the employee’s 
speech more substantially involve[s] matters of public concern.’” (quoting Connick, 461 
U.S. at 152)). 
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burden to justify disciplining an employee for speech that only minimally 
relates to a matter of public concern.
127
 
Despite correctly rejecting a per se rule for truthful testimony, the Butler 
court failed to consider the Supreme Court’s emphasis on the necessity for 
truthful testimony and the weight it should carry in deciding whether 
employee speech is of public concern.
128
 If the Tenth Circuit had properly 
considered a presumption that truthful testimony is of public concern and 
weighed the context, form, and content of Butler’s speech in the manner the 
Supreme Court dictated in Lane, it would have determined that his 
testimony met the public concern requirement.
129
  
B. Implementing a Broader Interpretation of Public Concern  
If there is a reasonable basis for holding that a public employee’s sworn 
testimony relates to a matter of public concern, courts should do so because 
of the unique importance of this type of speech.
130
 Public employee speech 
can have personal significance and still be of public interest. This was the 
case in Butler, where the welfare of children—an obvious topic of public 
interest—was involved.
131
 Therefore, while the court was right in asserting 
that Butler’s testimony was partly a personal matter, it failed to recognize 
that it was also of interest to the public and “at its root a societal and public 
issue.”
132
 Child custody hearings are publicly funded and part of the public 
record, similar to sentencing hearings, which the Tenth Circuit has held to 
be of public concern.
133
 The commonality between these two types of 
hearings lends further support to a finding that Butler’s testimony was on a 
matter of public concern. 
In an effort to protect the interests of the judicial system and those whom 
the court compels to participate in the judicial process, courts should set a 
high bar for employers who want to take adverse employment action 
                                                                                                             
 127. See id. 
 128. See Butler, 920 F.3d at 666 (Lucero, J., dissenting).  
 129. See id. at 666–67 (“The majority does not cite a single case from this circuit in 
which sworn testimony in judicial proceedings is so personal in nature as to overwhelm the 
strong presumption . . . towards treating such speech as involving matters of public 
concern.”). 
 130. See United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 721 (2012) (discussing the unique 
nature of courtroom testimony compared to other forms of speech). 
 131. See Bailey v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 69, 896 F.3d 1176, 1182 (10th Cir. 2018) 
(“Merely because speech concerns an issue of personal importance does not preclude its 
treatment as a public matter.”). 
 132. Butler, 920 F.3d at 665 (Lucero, J., dissenting). 
 133. Id. at 666 (citing Bailey, 896 F.3d at 1181). 
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against an employee on the basis of that employee’s sworn testimony. All 
citizens bear the legal duty to testify truthfully in court proceedings, 
regardless of employment status, and protecting the right to do so without 
fear of retaliation whenever possible reflects the importance of this civic 
duty.
134
 Courts should always consider the context and form of speech—
especially when testimony is compelled—unless the content of the speech 
has no plausible relation to the public interest.
135
  
Implementing a broader interpretation of speech that meets the public 
concern requirement and adopting a rebuttable presumption that truthful 
testimony is of public interest would sufficiently protect public employees 
without ignoring the government’s interest in regulating its employees’ 
speech. Under the Garcetti/Pickering balancing test, public employers have 
to meet a lesser burden to justify disciplining an employee for speech that 
has a lower degree of public concern.
136
 Thus, even with a more expansive 
idea of what qualifies as a matter of public concern, courts can still fairly 
balance the interests between a government employer and a public 
employee.  
VI. Conclusion 
Sworn testimony in a judicial proceeding is a unique form of speech, 
such that it deserves substantial First Amendment protections for public 
employees. The special importance of this type of speech has created a 
circuit split as to whether courts should adopt a per se rule that courtroom 
testimony is automatically a matter of public concern. The Fifth and Third 
Circuits, in adopting a per se rule, are not in line with the Supreme Court’s 
mandate in Connick and Lane that courts should use a case-by-case 
approach, considering the content, form, and context of employee speech to 
determine if it is of public concern. However, circuits that have rejected a 
per se rule, as the Tenth Circuit did in Butler, have not afforded enough 
protection to public employee speech in the form of truthful testimony. For 
courts to strike a proper balance between a public employee’s right to free 
speech, they must consider both the importance of witness testimony for the 
health of the justice system and a government employer’s interest in 
regulating its employees’ speech.  
                                                                                                             
 134. Deloney, supra note 121, at 711 (citing Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 
438 (1932)). 
 135. See Lane v. Franks, 573 U.S. 228, 241 (2014). 
 136. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 152 (1983). 
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As this Note proposes, the most effective way to balance these 
competing interests and safeguard public employees’ First Amendment 
rights in a manner consistent with Supreme Court precedent is to adopt a 
rebuttable presumption that courtroom testimony is of public concern. 
Moreover, courts should expand the interpretation of what qualifies as a 
matter of public concern to include, among other topics, speech like 
Butler’s testimony because child welfare is of public concern. With the 
approach advocated herein, courts can afford First Amendment protection 
to sworn testimony whenever its content has some plausible relation to a 
matter of public interest, while still allowing public employers to overcome 
the rebuttable presumption by successfully arguing that the speech at issue 
is wholly on a private matter. 
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